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Novel Procedures
The manner in which medieval history is written is changed by this book for novel procedures appear in it. Subsequent books which do not make use of them risk demolition by the use of these in later versions, even in other subjects.
Novel procedures
1. Printing every relevant eyewitness report and source, including letters, maps and photographs within the book. This makes possible a close analysis of every source etc within the book. Since every relevant source is included, the analysis should be as complete as possible. Other sources which some might believe to be relevant are included to make certain that nothing is left out, even when they are not relevant, just to show that they are not. The aim is to achieve as much compulsion in conclusions as possible. This does not make an inaccessible book. This book has been read with understanding and enjoyment by non academics. It does produce a compelling account which is unlikely to be bettered from the point of view of accuracy. In view of previous errors in references and quotations in some leading scholars' work, printing all the sources is the only way to overcome these. That there were errors in previous works would not otherwise be believed.
2. Nature of the analysis: Every statement in every relevant source which is relevant to a specific issue of interest is counted. Tables of results are constructed. For example, the evidence that the Scots dismounted their cavalry at Bannockburn is 20 to 0. [ Even if Barbour were counted it would still be 20 to 9 ]. This procedure produces as much compulsion as is likely to be possible. Every decision, or judgement is explained. The reader could in principle make a different judgement. If so he could alter the statistics for himself. Even so, because of the weight of argument, the conclusions will be unchanged.
3. Arguments are rated by procedures described in the book. This is a most compelling development. This is a book of arguments. The most prized kind of argument is one in which drastically altering the numbers makes no difference to the conclusion. Eg Prof Barrow believed [In 'Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland' ] that
A The Population of Scotland in 1314 was about 400,000
AND
B About 6,000 Scots defeated about 20,000 Englishmen
AND
C Robert Bruce was a charismatic leader
Now, if there are 400,000 in the population, then there are about 200,000 males. Of these about a quarter will be young men under 16, and another quarter will be old men over 46, say. This means about half the men would be men of fighting age ie 16-45. That is, there would be about100,000 Scotsmen of fighting age in 1314.
Question: If A and B and C are true where were the other 94,000 Scotsmen on the 24th June 1314?
A charismatic leader like Bruce should have been able to find more than 6,000 men for the battle of Bannockburn.
If there were 94,000 Scotsmen of fighting age not at the battle the Scots must have been a cowardly lot.
This question has exposed the impossibility of all three propositions being simultaneously true. It is an alpha plus argument. Meaning: Assuming A and C, it is extremely improbable that there were only 6,000 Scots at Bannockburn. How improbable? About 99%.
Conclusion: the number on the Scottish side was far greater than 6,000
4. Topographical Investigations. There are about 100 pages of investigation, with many photographs and every relevant old map printed. No book on this subject has done this before. Because of the analysis it has been possible to draw the best map ever seen of the area around Bannockburn in 1314. There are then, essentially two procedures involved here. First, the construction of a best map of the area. Second the justification of this map. Both are essential. This is a new procedure in this subject. The changes in the various maps of the area down the centuries are explained so as to account for the map of 1314.
5. A critique of all the worthy versions of the battle with any originality to expose their errors as a preliminary to determining all the answers to questions about the event. Some of this is done in an Appendix. [Mackenzie's is not treated because his book is still in print and his errors too obvious from other argument in the text to require restating.]
6. The importance of psychology in understanding contradictions in sources.
7. Investigating the reliability of sources within the book.
8. The state of English archery in 1314 is estimated in a full chapter.
9. The mathematics and physics of the cavalry charge are investigated in detail for the first time.
10. The Population of Scotland in 1314 is estimated in a full chapter by an unusual method.
DISCOVERIES all justified compellingly
1. Scottish cavalry dismounted before the main battle. The Scots fought on foot. The evidence is overwhelming.
2. Scottish Small Folk had no effect upon the Scottish victory. [None of the English saw them; and they could not have been seen for the woodland and Scots army in between on relatively flat ground]
3. The battle was fought in the Carse of Balquhiderock. The evidence is compelling. Roy's maps of c1750 show that there was, even then, too much woodland on the Dryfield for a battle to be possible, still less one in which English cavalry charged Scottish pikes. The Carse is the only possible site.
4. 14 independent parameters have been found which exactly define the position of the battle lines on the day of main battle.
5.The following have been defined properly for the first time: the line and position of the Pelstream; the position, size and nature of the bogs, so useful as secondary defences; the extent of woodland on the Dryfield and elsewhere in 1750.
6. Balquhiderock Wood is shown to have existed in 1314.
7. The Knoll in the Carse of Balquhiderock on the site of the current rubbish tip [old colliery] is shown to have existed in 1314.
8. The woodland in the area in 1314 has been estimated, with justification, from the woodland of 1750. This is invaluable. It shows where cavalry cannot travel or fight. It is immediately obvious from the best map showing this, that the battle could not have taken place in the Dryfield and indeed that the English would never have been allowed onto the Dryfield except in a space of 100 to 150 yds on the north bank of the burn at Milton. Briefly, the New Park existed in 1314 and it was a protected game reserve. This means it should have had enough woodland to conceal game. This tells us roughly by how much to increase the woodland of 1750 to get the woodland of 1314. A conservative estimate has been given, leaving extensive glades. Soon after 1314, that land was given away and ceased to be protected. Thereafter the land in the rest of the Dryfield and the New Park would have changed at about the same rate. The same increase in woodland on the rest of the Dryfield as the New Park is therefore appropriate from the map of 1750. In this way we have a good approximation to the woodland of 1314 from that of 1750. It is at least clear that there would have been far more woodland in 1314 than in 1750 for the population in 1314 was a third or a quarter of that in 1750.
9. The Roman Road was not in use in 1314. The English army approached by the road across the ford at Milton which went along St Ninians Main Street.
10. Professor Barrow was right and the National Trust wrong about the position of The Way.
11. Bruce killed Bohun a few yards from the north bank of the Bannock Burn at Milton Ford. The ford [the only one for a mile in either direction] and the woodland make this inevitable. The Vita Edwardi Secundi is the best source here.
12. Douglas and his men killed Gloucester about 100 yards west of the Bannock about the centre of the great bend.
13. Randolph fought Clifford and Beaumont's cavalry near the standing stones at Newhouse, north of St Ninians. Woodland and the slopes make this inevitable.
14. King Edward camped on the knoll in the Carse.
15. There was a pond in front of that knoll in 1314, for it was present in 1750 and 1931.
16. The Carse was not marshy. Roy's maps make this clear. The ground conditions on the day of the battle: pools of water lay in the Carse. Photographs show this clearly as the defining characteristic of this carse.
17. The Battle took its name from the stream and not the place. This is shown from an expanded image of Roy's map. There was no village in 1750 at Bannock and therefore no village in 1314, with far fewer people around.
18. The Bannock Burn was the first line of defence. Its high steep banks which would have been almost wholely wooded in 1314 form a magnificent obstacle to English cavalry in the van who could not have got into the Dryfield except via Milton Ford which the Scots defended heavily. The Dryfield was a mainly wooded natural fortress with steep wooded slopes impossibly difficult for any cavalry, but especially heavy cavalry, to ride up.
19. The English were effectively repulsed at Milton Ford in the clear knowledge that they had no other route to the Castle except by way of the Carse of Balquhiderock which, because of its bounding streams and many pools of water, made an excellent campsite for an English army of over 5,000 horses and 35,000 persons, some of them servants, all of them thirsty on a summer day.
20. The 12 maps showing the various stages in the battle are the best ever seen and will be difficult to improve upon significantly. The bases of these maps are Roy's maps of c1750 which have however been joined and modified to remove items, such as canals and lades, added after 1314 and to add the extra woodland necessary for a period four and half centuries earlier when there were far fewer people living in the area as shown by the chapter on population.
21. The date of the report of the battle in the Vita is at least by 1315, most probably 1314. The argument is compelling, original and important. The words in Lanercost should count from 1314; those in Scalacronica from 1325 or earlier, even though not written down until 1355.
22. English archers were ineffective because they were out of position behind their own cavalry and had to shoot over their heads. They also had to shoot over a short distance of less than 100 yards once the lines joined, an impossible distance over the heads of their own troops. They had to fire in a high parabola which made aiming very dificult at a thin line of Scots they could not see.
23. There were at least 10,000 on the Scottish side on the field at Bannockburn, more probably 15,000 and maybe as much as 20,000. The sources all speak of armies not dissimilar in size in the number of fighting men.
24. The 4 Scottish masterstrokes were: the decision to:
1. Fight on the north bank of the Bannock Burn on day 1 for that would force the English to camp in the Carse.
2. To dismount the Scottish cavalry on the main battle of day 2.
3. To attack on foot to get as close as possible to the English cavalry so as to deprive them of space to get up speed and reduce their momentum and capacity to damage stationary pikemen.
4. To get up before dawn, leave their prepared positions on the Dryfield in high woodland, descend the slopes of Balquhiderock Wood, line up in the Carse and advance rapidly on the English camped there with a view to hemming them in between the stream and the burn.