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Bannockburn is Revealed!


The battle of Bannockburn has never made sense.  For nearly forty years the accounts given by Professor Barrow in his book Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland and the National Trust in their booklets have been different, with the battle in different places and the streams and woodlands different.

In a new book, Bannockburn Revealed, William Wallace Cunningham Scott BA, BSc, MEd, FIMA, FSA (Scot) has resolved the dispute and shown that the traditional beliefs about the great Scottish victory in 1314 are false.  The mistakes are due to a failure to consider the reliability of sources, to analyse them altogether, to investigate thoroughly the old maps of the area and the ground itself.

Generations of Scotsmen have been reared on the idea that a small Scottish army defeated an English army 3 or 4 time as large, that the English were afraid because of skirmishes on the previous day, that there were 4 schiltroms or Scottish divisions under Moray, Douglas, Edward, Robert Bruce, that a charge of 500 light cavalry dealt with the English archers, and that the Scottish small folk waving sheets on a distant hill made the English believe that a second army was about to attack them.  Demoralized they fled....

These notions are demolished as soon as all the relevant sources are printed together for none of the English saw any Scottish cavalry charge or any reserve army; they all saw 3 Scottish schiltroms advance upon them on foot, and the armies were not dissimilar in size.  The one Englishman actually present, Robert Baston, who wrote his version for his Scottish captors does not tell of a smaller Scottish army for which, it had it been so, he might have been put to death.  He even writes of a multitude of Scots.  If the Scots army was smaller he should have said so.  Even two fragmentary Scottish reports written in 1314 do not suggest a small Scottish army.

Because of these important differences between Barbour and the English sources who wrote much sooner after the battle within recent memory, the fact that Barbour was probably not born until long after the battle, did not write his epic until 63 years later and died in 1395, Barbour should be considered a secondary source.

Further analysis confirms this fully.  Barbour simply invented most of the events in his version. The Scottish cavalry charge because he expected it and, the "Small Folk" waving sheets, in an effort to explain what had been forgotten.

Yet generations of Scots have been misled by his epic poem, The Bruce, if only because it is the only Scottish version of any length. If anybody should know whether there was a Scottish cavalry charge and an army of Small Folk, it should have been the English who were facing them.  None of them saw any such thing.  None of the 11 earliest sources saw this.  And what they did see is far more wonderful than has ever been appreciated before.   

Professor Barrow who has the English camp at the entry to the Carse, says the battle was fought in the Dryfield of Balquhiderock and that the battle took its name from the place and not the stream.  However, Roy's map c1750 shows only 3 houses 150yards apart then, which means that there was no village in 1750.  Four centuries earlier there would have been fewer houses, probably only one. 'no place "Bannockburn" in 1314.' .  When Roy's map is used to draw the woodland of 1314 it is clear that there could have been no battle on the Dryfield, for cavalry charges cannot take place in woodland.  Worse, the English could not have penetrated into the Dryfield because it was the finest natural fortress for miles around with a steep, densely wooded slope 20-60Ft high around it.  Barrow and every other scholar believe the English cavalry were in front facing the Scots and that they charged the advancing Scots.  How could they have charged up a steep wooded slope?  The ground shows it to be impossible.  Fifty-two photographs in the book reveal this and other features.

Barrow's version is false in having the English attack up the Roman Road, which had been given up by this time.  Bruce waited for the English at Milton Ford, leaving them 100yards space to blunt their lances on his pikemen.  Only a handful could attack at one time and were easily beaten off.  Elsewhere, shown in the Book by 52 magnificent photographs, the Bannock Burn was a wonderful defence with very steep wooded banks impassable to cavalry.  The strategy of the Scots was to force the English to move north East into the Carse.  Once camped there, there defeat was inevitable and Bruce knew it beforehand.  Otherwise he would not have remained to face such a finely equipped and experienced army.

What is so wonderful?  The Scots occupied a fine defensive position on high ground among woods that had served them well the day before.  The desire to remain must have been tremendous.  But a single cavalryman on his armoured horse weights a ton.  Unarmed foot soldiers hit by this at speed are like being run over by a tank: squashed flat and mangled.  The English had around 3000 heavy cavalry that the 500 lightly armoured Scottish cavalry were no match for.

The Scots left their good position on high ground to attack heavily armoured cavalry on a flat plain on foot!  What daring! What initiative! What bravery! What leadership! That was the way to win.  Get really close to their cavalry and deprive them of space to get up speed. 

Leaving the English in the Carse unmolested to get drunk the night before, the Scots rose at 3am, slid down the steep slopes of Balquhiderock wood and lined up just before dawn.  They then marched boldly on foot upon the English cavalry so that they could not get up speed.  Once they were very close, the Scots dug in with the butts of their pikes.  There was a short charge by the English, which was held by the Scots, at least twice as many as believed up to now.  Once the pikemen got in amongst the stationary cavalry the battle was as good as over because the English could not manoeuvre in the Carse where they were hemmed in by the Pelstream and the Bannock, wider because of the tide and recent rain and obstructed by palisades of trees on both banks.   And the feared English archers were reduced to bystanders because they were behind the cavalry and very close to the Scots.  So close that firing over the heads of their mounted knights was impossible without hitting their own men in the back.  This is what the eyewitness reports tell us.  The Scots won because they were brilliant!                  


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